

AD-A220 654

DTIC FILE COPY

(2)

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE GIDEON DOCTRINE: AN ARMY STRATEGIC VISION FOR A WORLD IN CHAOS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. RICHARD WALLACE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

DTIC
ELECTE
APR 18 1990
S D

12 FEBRUARY 1990



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

12 04 17 1990

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
The Gideon Doctrine: An Army Strategic Vision for a World in Chaos		Individual Study Project
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER		
7. AUTHOR(s)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
Lieutenant Colonel J. Richard Wallace		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
Same		12 February 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
		35
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
<p>The world stands on the threshold of a new era. The changes of 1989 have unhinged our national security strategy. At the center of the new strategic debate rests the question of the Army's participation in the strategic planning process. Many land force advocates believe now is the time for the Army to take the lead in this process. To support that theme, this paper first projects a future strategic environment of a multi-polar world erupting in potential chaos. The author next discusses the strategic language the Army must use to participate in this strategic planning process and the impact of emerging joint</p>		

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

doctrine on future strategic planning. Finally, an Army strategic vision is proffered which rejects deterrence as its end but accepts the role of armed force, primarily landpower, in maintaining order in a changing and volatile world.

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

USAWC Military Studies Program Paper

The Gideon Doctrine: An Army
Strategic Vision for a World in Chaos

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel J. Richard Wallace, Armor

Colonel (Ret.) E.H. Grayson, Jr.
Project Advisor

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.**

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
12 February 1990

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

Gideon ("mighty man of valor"): The warrior judge of ancient Israel who led his people to decisive victory over Midian. His army of 32,000 men was reduced to 300 by a series of Divine edicts. Yet, with skill, leadership and ingenuity, Gideon and his army of 300 succeeded in utterly destroying a Midian army numbering 135,000.

Peace reigned for forty years.

SEARCHED		J C C
INDEXED		
SERIALIZED		
FILED		
By _____		
Date _____		
Approved _____		
Dist _____	as a _____ Special _____	
A-1		



Abstract

AUTHOR: John R. Wallace, LTC, AR

TITLE: The Gideon Doctrine: An Army Strategic
Vision for a World in Chaos

FORMAT: Individual Study Project Intended for Publication

DATE: 12 February 1990 Pages: 25 Classification: Unclassified

The world stands on the threshold of a new era. The changes of 1989 have unhinged our national security strategy. At the center of the new strategic debate rests the question of the Army's participation in the strategic planning process. Many land force advocates believe now is the time for the Army to take the lead in this process. To support that theme, this paper first projects a future strategic environment of a multi-polar world erupting in potential chaos. The author next discusses the strategic language the Army must use to participate in this strategic planning process and the impact of emerging joint doctrine on future strategic planning. Finally, an Army strategic vision is proffered which rejects deterrence as its end but accepts the role of armed force, primarily landpower, in maintaining order in a changing and volatile world.

Introduction

We stand at the threshold of a new era. The year 1989, so called "annus mirabilis," brought to an end the post-war era. The West can claim triumph in the Cold War even though 'mopping up' operations continue. Communism retreats headlong as a worldwide ideology, having lost its missionary appeal. The wisdom of the policy of containment has long last been demonstrated. An unanticipated and sudden result of these changes has been to throw the U.S. national security strategy into disarray.

One question now being addressed in the ensuing national security debate is how and when the U.S. envisions the future use of armed force as an element of national power. A natural extension of this argument is the discussion on which element of military power will be most effective in this new world order. In these discourses it is imperative that the Army offer a credible vision on the employment of land forces as it participates in the nation's strategic planning process.

In fact, some force designers say that not only should the Army respond in these critical times with its strategic vision for land power but that it should take the dominant role in the strategic planning process. Assuredly, without some philosophical strategic underpinning about the use of force in the world, the Army and the entire defense establishment can only react to the crush of world and domestic events. The result will surely be a patchwork Army.

This paper develops an Army strategic vision that can form the basis for rational land power force development and force employment in the joint strategic planning process. It first forecasts the anticipated strategic security environment. Next, a brief examination of modern strategic language precedes a discussion of expected national security objectives and the impacts of emerging joint doctrine on strategic planning. Lastly, the discussion focuses all these factors to develop an Army strategic vision for the role of land power in the defense of the interests of the United States.

The Strategic Security Environment For a Transitioning Century: A World of Chaos

Although focusing on the world's current business climate, businessman and writer Tom Peters' recent remarks succinctly summarize the views of observers about the present and future state of world affairs. Peters stated that a recent quest to achieve understanding of the current global climate brought him to:

...the point of total incoherence. The important news in some respects is that incoherence is really what the story is all about. The absolute madness, craziness, unpredictability and wildness going on throughout the U.S. and global economy mean, in my opinion at least, that anybody at any level in any organization who thinks they understand anything about anything is, in fact, out to lunch.¹

Coupled with events in the last months of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Central America, some assenting observers believe that world reality is changing so quickly that

old hypotheses about world politics are invalid.² Accordingly, this section reviews the major themes of change in this transitioning world: the breakdown of the bipolar order, the emergence of North-South confrontations, the astonishing acceleration of technological advancement, the appearance of new U.S. domestic realities, and the manifestation of global economic interdependence.

. Brave New World

While the new world is not going to be like the old, Charles Taylor asserts certain assumptions can be made:³

- Neither general war nor a war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. nor a war among other major powers will likely occur, although conflict remains prevalent in world affairs.

- Neither a worldwide economic collapse nor major world depression will likely occur although irreversible global economic dependence is emerging.

- No major scientific or technological breakthrough will occur that will give one world nation the ultimate power of intimidation over the other although technological advances will pervade our lives.

. Super-Power Relations and the Bipolar World

The majority of our life experience has been in a world perceived almost exclusively through the East-West prism.⁴ Now we are witnessing the massive breakdown of bipolarity even though the U.S. and U.S.S.R. retain their massive military power. Some see economic industrialization, modernization and competition as the determinants of a new international political order.⁵

Simultaneously, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are becoming comfortable with the idea of sustainable peaceful competition.

Their world views are mutually sympathetic for the first time, both being preoccupied with domestic issues and more sober about the limitations of their power in world politics.⁶ Some believe the U.S.S.R. will become much less confrontational as it focuses on economic problems.⁷ Additionally, we may witness alliance shifts as the Warsaw Pact's effectual disintegration presents new opportunities for U.S. policies, while the U.S. role in NATO may become one of "first among equals" as opposed to "Chairman of the Board."⁸

These changes will bring new tensions. The Soviet Union is now trying to establish its vision of a "common European House" with no place at the table for an American presence. German reunification looms with unknown repercussions to NATO and the EEC. While the United States welcomes the democratization of Eastern Europe, most of the region remains in economic upheaval and the democratization process also surfaces its more fanatical political elements. Old East European animosities may percolate new political strains without the stabilizing influence of Soviet divisions.

In summary, our greatest future challenge may be the "ferment and evolution of the Soviet state",⁹ perhaps an even more alarming and dangerous entity if Gorbachev's vision fails.¹⁰ Both superpowers recognize the emergence of Japan and Western Europe as the second and third most powerful military/economic entities. Although reliance on hints of force will still play a part in world affairs, the two superpowers, unleashed from their mutual hostilities, might look for other

areas to jointly exercise their power and influence in the face of these new realities.¹¹

. The Emerging North-South World

With the change in superpower relations comes the reality of a world dominated not by two entities but by four or, perhaps, five¹²--the U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, Western Europe and, perhaps, China. Again, economic gauges measure the change. By 2010, it is projected that the combined GNP of four East Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan) will exceed the U.S. GNP. The Soviet Union would probably regress to the world's fourth largest GNP but could have the second largest if the proposed reforms succeed dramatically.¹³ By 2010, it is predicted that India's GNP will approximate France's while Brazil's will approximate the United Kingdom's.¹⁴ These multi-polar relationships driven by economic factors will likely form the world into a North-South grouping, primarily the First World versus the Third World.

Conditions in the 'South' or Third World don't augur for stability or growth. Some see the emerging reality of a Third World, unwilling and unable to help itself, as the world's permanent underclass where development has lost force as an international issue.¹⁵ In fact, the chief economic tie of the majority of the Third World nations to the world system could be the "negative umbilical of their international debt."¹⁶ Indeed, the very poorest seemed doomed to an economic and national decline into nonexistence.¹⁷ This formation of a

permanent world welfare class becomes more alarming as we review demographic projections.

During the next century, world population will double with 90 percent of that growth occurring in the Third World.¹⁸ More specifically, by 2020, the population of 123 preindustrial nations will grow from 2.4 percent of the world's population to 34 percent.¹⁹ The result is a widening gap between rich and poor nations coupled with an inability of these poor states to meet rising expectations of their citizens.²⁰

Intermixed with this cauldron of Third World politics is the growing spectre of AIDS. Political stability in some countries could be affected by this biological apocalypse,²¹ particularly Caribbean, Central African and South American countries. At risk, of course, are large portions of the human infrastructure, particularly the educated elites whose relative wealth and accompanying lifestyles place them at greater risk. Additionally, Africa is becoming an AIDS infesting ground for deployed military forces as Cuba and France have discovered.²²

Auspiciously, the one bright spot in Third World realities is the seemingly widespread acceptance and expectation that democratic institutions and practices must eventually work for them.²³

. Technology: A Two-Edged Scientific Excalibur

A further element in our 'brave new world' is the exponential scientific and technological advances, particularly as they are applied to military weaponry. These technologies include Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) and other

superchips, superconductors, nanotechnology, new materials, information processing, merging technologies and computer integrated manufacturing.²⁴

The U.S. military requires time to access new ideas and evaluate their potential. This dilemma confronts head-on the reality of the "accelerating pace of change that is speeding product obsolescence, shortening the time required to produce new services" on the embodiment of a good idea.²⁵ Contradictorily,

...despite the mechanization of all aspects of warfare over the last century, war remains a quintessentially human authority. If one even forgets the human dimension of conflict, all the technology in the world is unlikely to prevent final defeat...the impact of technology on the intangible of morale may ultimately have more to do with success or failure on the battlefield than how far that technology has actually advanced.²⁶

Following that theme, technology's major military impact for the U.S. Army may be in its ability to compress time and space, to allow us to bring greater force to bear in the shortest time, to get there first with the most.²⁷

Unfortunately, our 'Excalibur' has a double edge, that is, the proliferation of high technology weapons into the Third World. By 1999, no less than 18 countries will have short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their inventories and almost as many will have chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities.²⁸ These are the new realities that face U.S. planners who envision the future projection of armed force throughout the world.

. Domestic Realities: Social and Fiscal Constraints

No service or national strategy can be divorced from domestic influences, particularly in our democratic society. The U.S. faces several national challenges likely to emerge as prominent issues in the next decades: an improved national educational system, a globally competitive national economy, a reinvigorated national space program, a cleansed national and global environment, and expanded national science and technology efforts.²⁹ Proponents of all of these programs will compete for scarce domestic resources even as our expected demographic shifts proffer for even more changing domestic priorities.

The U.S., because of illegal and legal immigration across its southern border and across the Pacific, will by 2010 approach a population that is one-third black, Hispanic andr Asian. Non-Hispanic/non-Asian influence will no longer dominate U.S. national and international interests and policies, especially as the key states of Texas, California and Florida undergo dramatic demographic change.³⁰

These domestic realities combine with others to brew a bitter draft for a U.S. strategist. The other ingredients are the public's and Congress' perception of a diminished or nonexistent Soviet threat and an aversion to U.S. involvement almost anywhere in the world. The result is tremendous pressures to reduce defense expenditures. Witness the attitude of a reformist Congress demanding to see a coherent national military strategy before it authorizes dollars for force structure or weapon systems.

In summary, change emerges as the only constant foreseen over the next two decades. U.S. policy may therefore need to change from one of containment of communism to one of containment of chaos, particularly in the Third World. Instead of alliances formed to contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. may find itself allied with her former nemesis policing chaos in the South world. Employment of force there could be interpreted as an international consensus on preserving values important to the world system.³¹

Therefore, U.S. armed forces may find their next duty to be one of confronting and managing chaos in the Third World. This role will allow time for the economic and political power of the current two superpowers to produce conditions in the Third World that meet the expectations of emerging Third World citizens. How the Army perceives its role in this environment will determine the Army's strategic vision.

. . . Why an Army Vision?

There is even a question that precedes this topic, namely, "Why an Army?" In the nuclear age, that question has been asked often. Critics claim our national policy of massive nuclear retaliation left the Army uncertain of its place in U.S. policy and strategy, uncertain if civilians recognized the need for an Army, and thus uncertain of our service's future.³²

Others say a correct historical perspective shows land power always has been the decisive element in armed conflict, even though the Army is critically dependent on the Navy and Air Force.³³ Still others say an Army is critical because Soviet

power is expressed in terms of land power, and that land power is a variable and fixed symbol of American determination.³⁴

Perhaps the best answer to this fundamental question comes from, surprisingly, Navy Admiral J.C. Wylie:

The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun. This man is the final power in war. There are those who would dispute this as an absolute but it is my belief that while other means may critically influence war today, after whatever devastation and destruction may be inflicted on an enemy, if the strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is the soldier.³⁵

And Wylie believes this observation to be true until "...there is brought forth some argument more compelling than simple assertion to the contrary."³⁶

Thus, we need an Army because land power has been and will continue to be decisive in armed conflict. Nonetheless, some critics still have questioned the need or plausibility of Army leadership in the strategic planning process.

Other more persuasive arguments for Army leadership in strategic planning center on the assertions that it matters much more to the Army than it does the Air Force or Navy to be prepared for the next major armed conflict.³⁷ The Army can ill afford to be unprepared for any conflict and will be measured not by its ability to deter conflict but by its ability to participate effectively if conflict occurs.³⁸ More succinctly, Americans believe the Army gets paid to execute, not huddle.

Indeed, if land power is decisive in conflict, the Army's failure to execute well could mean disaster for the nation.

Thus, the need for an Army and strategic vision to guide the use of that Army is compelling. And to have compelling arguments, the Army must understand and use strategic language correctly.

. . The language of strategy.

The word strategy is derived from the Greek word 'strategos', significantly meaning the 'art' of the general, not the plan of the general.³⁹ Strategy, we have learned, can be easy to talk about, but hard to do. There are many varieties and definitions to this concept. In fact, there are more definitions and kinds of strategy than there are varieties and definitions of politics and economics. It's been called a loose sort of word or better, an accordion word.⁴⁰ However, here are some definitions for consideration. Strategy is:

The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.⁴¹

And military strategy is:

The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.⁴²

If you desire a more compact definition, try these:

... strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.⁴³

The essential notion of strategy is captured in the relationship of means to ends.⁴⁴

In its most fundamental sense, military strategy consists of an objective and a course of action to achieve that objective.⁴⁵

A strategy is a concept for relating means to ends.⁴⁶

The essence of strategy is in the relational concept.⁴⁷

By strategy, I mean a definable path toward goals.⁴⁸

Strategy equals Ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus Ways (courses of actions) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).⁴⁹

Military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources.⁵⁰

Strategy involves having a concept, priorities and a direction - ones that are flexible and adaptable to changing situations - for the rational and disciplined allocation of resources to achieve specific objectives.⁵¹

Summarizing, modern theorists seem to agree that the key concept of strategy includes the art of relating ends to means. The ends and means may be plural but the single concept that relates them is strategy.⁵² Ends include interests, goals, objectives and purposes while means include devices, tools, power, and forces for achieving the ends. Strategy is the concept, design or scheme that relates one as being optimum and effective with respect to the other.⁵³ I believe the Army will find the concepts of relating ends to means most useful in directing strategic planning.

. . The Goals of a Strategy.

Now that we have reviewed the language of strategy, we might ask what is an appropriate goal or end for a military strategy. While Clausewitz states that war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,⁵⁴ modern thinkers say a successful strategy achieves this goal without war. In fact, some say the ultimate aim of strategy should be to influence the will of

opponents and the will and commitment of allies with the clever application of economic measures.⁵⁵ Congealing these ideas suggests that candidate strategic goals for focusing national and Army strategic concepts could be:⁵⁶

- 1) Prevent World War III,
- 2) Prevent Soviet coercion of the U.S. and its allies,
- 3) Prevent coercion of the U.S. or its allies by other states,
- 4) Ensure our nation's dominant economic strength and growth and maintain an open and free trading system.
- 5) Encourage global stability.

In fact, we will see that these goals are reflected in our national security strategy.

. . Is There a Strategic Principium?

Even if we have an agreed language of strategy and an agreed end for a strategy, does there exist an underlying principle that should focus our strategic formulations? I think that the answer is 'yes' and that Clausewitz, among others, clearly develops this principle. In On War he states:

It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point....This is the first principle of strategy.⁵⁷

and,

the best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point....There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated.⁵⁸

To Clausewitz, concentration of strength at the decisive point becomes the First Principle. What is the decisive point?

Clausewitz gives guidance on this topic also, concluding, it is necessary to first determine:

the dominant characteristic of both belligerents. . Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity, develops the hub of all power and movement...the point against which all our energies should be directed.⁵⁹

Clausewitz summarizes:

After everything we have so far said on the subject, we can identify two basic principles that underlie all strategic planning and serve to guide all other considerations. The first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone. The attack on these sources must be compressed into the fewest possible actions, again, ideally, into one. Finally, all minor actions must be subordinated as much as possible. In short the first principle is: act with the utmost concentration...the second is: act with the utmost speed.⁶⁰

Summarizing, I submit the strategic principle on which to base an Army strategic vision is to concentrate overwhelming strength with utmost speed against the enemy's decisive point, his center of gravity. Remember: easy to talk about, hard to do!

Let's review what we now know any potentially successful military strategy must include. First, it must support the national security strategy. Second, it must contain a concept that relates ends to means. Third, this concept must orchestrate decisive power at the decisive place and time. The discussion must now focus on integrating these key elements with two concepts of emerging joint doctrine.

. . The Impact of Emerging Joint Doctrine

At the national level, President Reagan's National Security Strategy of the United States states five key national interests

which our national security strategy seeks to assure.⁶¹ They are:

- the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation
- a healthy and growing U.S. economy
- a stable and secure world
- the growth of human freedom, democratic institutions and free market economies
- healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

Additionally, the new Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as described in the unclassified version of JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (MOP 7) produces prolific strategic guidance for all services. The documents in the JSPS, entitled the Chairman's Guidance (CG), National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) capture the desired near-term programming and budgetary processes for each service. They are also designed to structure the service's strategic vision.

What is now unique from past practice, however, is that the JSPS clearly places responsibility for national military strategy formulation with the JCS and combatant CINCs, not the individual services. Consequently, to talk of individual service strategies (such as the Navy's Maritime Strategy) is counter to our new doctrine as the theater CINCs will accomplish their theater strategies by integrating all combatant forces at their disposal under joint command structures. Clearly, our joint doctrine demands the end of single service views of the world although service inputs will still be sought and considered.

Additionally, a critical new JCS concept that will impact all services, particularly land forces, is the operational continuum. The operational continuum is defined as the "general states of peacetime competition, conflict and war within which various types of military operational activities are conducted."⁶² The continuum is intended to help the CINC articulate the strategic situations within his theater and the levels of resources he needs from all instruments of national power to accomplish theater strategic goals. The continuum, I believe, has tremendous implications for all services, particularly the U.S. Army. But, first, here is a better explanation of the continuum.

Briefly, the three states are delineated as: ⁶³

- Peacetime Competition - A non-hostile state wherein political, economic, psychological, and military measures, short of U.S. combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives. Included are security assistance, peacekeeping, contingency and counter-narcotics operations.

- Conflict - An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. Typical operations would include counterinsurgency phases I and II, strikes, raids and counter-terrorism.

- War - Sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. Included are nuclear or conventional war and counterinsurgency phase III operations.

Notice the terms high intensity conflict (HIC) and mid-intensity conflict (MIC) no longer appear in doctrine. However,

the term low intensity conflict is retained in the doctrine but is described to exist throughout the continuum, not as a separate state.

The most far-reaching conclusion from these doctrinal definitions is that the Army today can find itself operating under a unified command structure in a constant armed state somewhere on the operational continuum in some operational environment to achieve national security objectives.

In summary, the two most salient impacts of emerging joint doctrine on strategic formulations is (1) the JCS and CINCs formulate military strategy, not individual services and (2) the operational continuum recognizes we are in an armed state somewhere on the continuum almost constantly. The latter doctrine clashes with and, perhaps, debunks forever the concept of deterrence.

. . . To Deter or Not to Deter - That Is the Question

We have arrived at a critical juncture in this strategy discussion, specifically that deterrence is a desired or viable 'end' of a relevant and effective land force strategic vision. Much, perhaps much too much, is made of the Army's role of deterrence. In fact, the Army may have given so much emphasis to deterring that we have neglected developing sufficient doctrine to fight in any but a small portion of the continuum.

Deterrence like strategy has many definitions. Deterrence is armed suasion operating on the mind of an opponent that prevents him from taking a certain action because of the fear of consequences. In reality, it is futile, perhaps dangerous, to

rely on this concept for national security because of three reasons: the complexity of the human mind, the diversity of cultures we hope to impact and the varying perceptions, influenced by distance from visible U.S. military means, of U.S. power.

Even Rome recognized that the limits of her Empire coincided with her ability to conjure visions in opponents minds of the consequences of defying her legions. Where there was no knowledge of or respect for her legions, Rome had no influence and, thus, no deterrence. Likewise, we see today that we can perhaps deter the Soviets from nuclear attack while at the same time can have absolutely no sway on South American drug cartels to stop drug shipments to our country. The former has a clear vision of U.S. power; the latter consider it irrelevant or impotent.

The most central question to be posed by our Army's presence represents the visible and forceful determination of the nation. Although the presence of our Army may deter conflict, it is not its capabilities or size that deter so much as its unavoidable link to the shadow of nuclear war. If presence is to be linked with a credible deterrent, then in any contingency where we have no Army presence, establishing an Army presence quickly may be more important than the size of the force employed.⁶⁴

In Clausewitzian terms, deterrence operates in an opponent's mind which, I believe, should be viewed as the deterrence center of gravity. The rapid appearance of Army forces operates on the decisive point, the opponent's mind, creating the desired

outcome: the imposition of your will on the opponent and avoidance of conflict.

However, Clausewitz warns to treat all possible engagements as real ones because of their consequences.⁶⁵ No deterrence positioning will have the slightest value "unless at the end of it all the general was in a position to fight and to win."⁶⁶

We are then inexorably drawn back to the conclusion that the Army's role is to fight. Using the current JCS doctrinal definition of the operational continuum, the Army can view itself in a constant or almost constant armed struggle somewhere on this continuum. Since deterrence is a state of inaction, to pass into a state of struggle or conflict means deterrence has failed and is no longer operative. And since the doctrinal view now has the Army in an armed struggle somewhere between peacetime competition and general war, it is nonsense to conclude that deterrence, or inaction, is a sensible 'end' of an Army strategic vision.

Implied also is that a theater CINC may use operations in the conflict portion of the continuum to avoid the outbreak of more serious conflict or war. More directly, the JCS doctrine frees the CINC from the ambiguities of deterrence and casts him into an arena where use of military force, carefully orchestrated with other elements of national power, can achieve U.S. security objectives. More importantly, our doctrine sees the Army using armed suasion and force to contain chaos and avoid the possibility of a cataclysmic struggle that could threaten national survival.

. . . An Army Strategy Vision: The Gideon Doctrine

To summarize, so far I have asserted that:

- The strategic environment for the next two decades promises change and chaos, dominated by the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, emergence of a multi-polar, economically inter-dependent world overshadowed by the spectre of potential Third World poverty and conflict.

- The decisive force in armed conflict will be land force.

- A strategy requires a concept relating ends to means.

- A fundamental requirement of a strategy is to expediently place decisive power at the decisive place.

- Emerging joint doctrine recognizes armed struggle occurring at many points along an operational continuum and the role of the JCS and CINCs in developing national strategy.

- The stated end of a strategy should be the containment of regional and global chaos that could produce a regional or world war or an equally serious threat to our and our allies' survival.

To that end, the Army's strategic vision, the Gideon Doctrine, for a world in chaos should be framed as follows:

Achieve all vital national security objectives, while containing regional political and military chaos and preventing global or regional war (Ends), by maintaining the ability to rapidly apply decisive power at the decisive point (the opponent's center of gravity) (Ways), by conducting all operations represented and required in the operational continuum throughout all operational environments. (Means)

Implications for the 21st Century Army

The Gideon Doctrine may seem too broad to have any major implications for the future Army. However, I assert the implications are severe and its impact wide reaching. Each implication could receive major research or discussion by itself but each are noted here briefly for consideration and discussion in other forums.

. The Army must develop the forces and doctrine to apply power in all portions of the continuum.

. We must view ourselves in a constant armed struggle to execute the security policies and needs of the United States. We, like the Romans, face the prospect not of a decisive conflict but of a permanent state of war, albeit limited.⁶⁷ The strategic vision requires the Army to use armed force to avoid a future or more severe conflict.

. The most central question to be posed by any chairman or CINC advising the NCA about the possible use of military power in the world should be, "Can the U.S. place decisive power at the decisive point (if that point can even be determined at all) in a specified time to achieve the stated political/strategic 'endgame'?" If the answer is 'no' or 'doubtful', then military means should be rejected until such time as decisive power can be generated or the 'endgame' should be pursued by application of other instruments of national power.

. The vision requires the application of decisive force at all levels of the operational continuum. Decisive force may be civil affairs battalions, competent linguists, and security

assistance teams in more cases than it may be light divisions or cavalry regiments. However, in the conflict-war portion of the continuum, light divisions may not provide decisive power at the decisive point but such operations may require heavier units. In past Roman terms, the auxiliaries may not have been sufficient; Rome may have had to send heavy legions. Therefore, do not disband today's 'legions' but make it easier and possible to get them to the conflict when needed.

. In most cases decisive force, advanced technology contributions aside, means superior numbers. Consequently, in a world less reliant on nuclear weapons, and where chaos remains operative, the nation may need more land power, not less. This idea runs counter to the peace expectation rampant in the American public and Congress but may need advocates who can rationalize their position with a strategic vision.

. To deliver decisive power to the decisive point requires adequate strategic mobility. The strategy calls for more air and sea capability to deliver the correct number and types of land forces to the point of struggle. The JCS must seek innovative solutions to this problem. Prepositioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) storage on cargo ships (mothballed aircraft carriers?) instead of in Central Europe may be one answer. More importantly, NATO cargo ships are probably not going to be available for crisis outside of NATO. Therefore, we must plan for ships from other sources.

. If force structure is reduced, then the vision requires all divisions, including forward deployed, to have contingencies

in other theaters. All divisions, regardless of station, would have worldwide assignments and orientation.

. The vision implies the need for the Army to take the lead in the strategic planning process. As the prospect of nuclear conflict diminishes, the Army emerges as the focal service and land power becomes decisive. The Air Force and Navy, although absolutely critical, become viewed as assets to assist and sustain the Army in its missions. If the Army takes the lead in the strategic planning process, we run the risk of kindling severe service rivalries as national resources diminish. Nonetheless, Army leadership may find no better time to act.

. Most missions required in peacetime competition are primarily missions best suited to Army force structure. Additionally, many of these missions can be executed for training within the U.S. for our own citizens. Few governors would refuse the free services of an Army construction engineer battalion and few large city mayors would refuse the temporary loan of a M.A.S.H. unit. The Army should now seize these opportunities and the bonanza of resources and goodwill this tactic could provide. In so doing, the Army could maintain certain force structure and readiness levels and satisfy national needs at the same time.

. To apply decisive power rapidly may require the speedy mobilization of reserves, a 'surge' capability across the continuum. This requirement has implications for Reserve and National Guard force structure, training and mobilization planning.

. The strategy requires vision and selflessness of Army leaders.

Dealing with the internal interests that now freeze the Army into its focus on conflict in Central Europe is probably the most important institutional problem confronting Army leadership in the next decade.⁶⁸

The strategic vision requires armor, artillery and infantry to bury branch parochialism and design forces to better execute the vision regardless of who comes out winner or losers in terms of spaces or general officer billets. The nation's interests demand it be done.

. Finally, the strategic vision changes our relations and approach to civilian leaders, particularly Congress. Congress demands a strategy from the U.S. military. It is generally frustrated in achieving these demands. This strategic roadmap provides a portion of such a strategy, albeit one they may not warmly embrace at first. However, like the Romans, it is a vision that allows us to protect our advanced society against a variety of threats rather than concentrate solely on destroying the forces of our enemies in major battles.⁶⁹

Conclusion

Like Alice, the U.S. Army needs to accept quickly the advice of the Cheshire Puss and decide where it wants to get to. Currently everyone offers opinions. From private to general to reformer to congressional staffer come suggestions about force structures of all sizes and types. "Heavier," "lighter," "not too light," 'one Army not two,' 'organize around brigades,' 'organize around corps,' 'organize like we are now,' 'combined

arms battalion,' 'trim down battalions,' or 'expeditionary units' are just some of the themes around which the arguments orbit. Unfortunately, the key foundation of the arguments is missing: the strategic vision upon which we are to structure our Army of the 21st century. This paper has been an attempt to proffer a strategic vision, a set of strategic pylons, as it were, on which the future Army can build and take shape.

The Cold War may be almost over but descendants of the 'barbarians' that plagued Rome are still with us. On the banks of the Danube simmer ancient passions; the drug cartels of South America still ply their rot; the religious fanaticism of the Middle East spews its hatred and totalitarian regimes rule millions of cardboard shanty dwellers. Some would even say the U.S. has allowed a few barbarians to slip through the gates. All of these modern 'barbarians' are the threats of the new century.

Whatever vision the Army adopts and builds upon, we must execute tenaciously. Some will be tempted to waiver from passing glimpses of these 'barbarians,' just as surely as there must have been ripples in the ranks of Caesar's legions when confronted by thousands of blue-painted Gauls. However, if we in the Army are tenacious in the face of our adversities, we have the opportunity, combined with the other great resources of our nation, to translate the wonders of 1989, annus mirabilis, into the 'decem anni mirabilis', or even the 'centum mirabilis'.

--arma pacix --

Endnotes

1. Tom Peters, Thriving On Chaos, p. 1.
2. Regina Gaillard, "After Containment: International Changes Through a Non-Authoritarian Looking Glass," in On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control In National Security Strategy, ed. by LTC David E. Shaver, p. 59.
3. Charles W. Taylor, Alternative World Scenarios For Strategic Planning, pp. 13-14.
4. Gaillard, p. 60.
5. Taylor, p. 15.
6. Gaillard, p. 61.
7. Taylor, p. 16.
8. Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Sources of Change In the Future Security Environment, p. 18.
9. David M. Abshire, Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy, p. 289.
10. Ibid.
11. Gaillard, p. 66.
12. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, p. 20.
13. Commission, p. 3.
14. Commission, p. 4.
15. Gaillard, p. 63.
16. Gaillard, p. 64.
17. Taylor, p. 18.
18. Gaillard, p. 64.
19. Taylor, p. 16.
20. Gaillard, p. 64.

21. Commission, p. 11.
22. Commission, p. 11.
23. Gaillard, p. 22.
24. Michael Moodie, The Dreadful Fury: Advanced Military Technology and the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 6-12.
25. Ibid., p. 15.
26. Ibid., p. 37.
27. Ibid., p. 61.
28. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Army as a Strategic Tool in 90s and Beyond," Army Magazine, Feb 1990, p. 23.
29. Taylor, p. 22.
30. Ibid., p. 21.
31. Gaillard, p. 66.
32. Harry G. Summers, "A Bankrupt Military Strategy," The Atlantic Magazine, June 1989, p. 35.
33. T.N. Dupuy, "The Crux is Land Power," Course 2: War, National Policy and Strategy Selected Readings, Vol. IV, p. 308.
34. David H. Petraeus, Daniel J. Kaufman, Osa A. Clark IV, "Why An Army?" Army Magazine, Feb. 87, p. 28.
35. J.C. Wylie, "Assumptions Underlying A General Theory," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., p. 26.
36. Wylie, p. 27.
37. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, p. 131.
38. Ibid., p. 166.
39. Abshire, p. 12.

40. Builder, p. 48.
41. JCS Pub 1-02, p. 350.
42. Ibid., p. 232.
43. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 128.
44. Builder, p. 49.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "A Methodology for Developing a Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., p. 3.
50. Ibid., p. 4.
51. Abshire, p. 12.
52. Builder, p. 49.
53. Ibid.
54. Clausewitz, p. 75.
55. Abshire, p. 12.
56. Ibid., p. 168.
57. Clausewitz, p. 195.
58. Ibid., p. 204.
59. Ibid., p. 595.
60. Ibid., p. 617.
61. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 3.
62. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS PUB 3-0 (Test), pp. xiii-xxiii.
63. Ibid.

- 64. Builder, p. 192.
- 65. Michael Howard, Clausewitz, p. 42.
- 66. Howard, p. 43.
- 67. Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire,
p. xii.
- 68. Builder, p. 189.
- 69. Luttwak, p. xii.

Bibliography

- Abshire, David M. Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.
- Beatty, Jack. "The Exorbitant Anachronism." The Atlantic Monthly, June 1989, pp. 40-52.
- Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
- Builder, Carl H. The Army in the Strategic Planning Process. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1987.
- Calleo, David P. Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Sources of Change In the Future Security Environment. Working Group Report. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
- Dupuy, T.N. COL (Ret). "The Crux is Land Power," Course 2: War, National Policy and Strategy Selected Readings, Vol. IV, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989.
- Howard, Michael. Clausewitz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub. 3-0 (Test): Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. Washington: January 1990.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memorandum of Policy No. 84: Joint Strategic Planning System (17th Revision). Washington: Oct 1989.
- Komer, Robert W. "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Course 2, War, National Policy and Strategy Selected Readings, Vol. IV. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1 September 1989.
- Luttwak, Edward. On the Meaning of Victory. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
- Luttwak, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Luttwak, Edward. The Pentagon and the Art of War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

- Lykke, Arthur F., Jr., ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 3-8: "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy," by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.
- Lykke, Arthur F., Jr., ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 9-11: "A Methodology For Developing a Military Strategy," by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.
- Lykke, Arthur F., Jr., ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 25-27: "Assumptions Underlying a General Theory," by Adm. J.C. Wylie.
- Moodie, Michael. The Dreadful Fury: Advanced Military Technology and the Atlantic Alliance. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Morin, Michael J. Military Strategy and Theater Operations. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1988.
- Peters, Tom. Thriving on Chaos. Speech. Dallas: Lowe's Anatole Hotel, May 1989.
- Petraeus, David H.; Kaufman, Daniel J.; Clark, Osa A. IV. "Why An Army?" Army Magazine, Feb 87, pp. 26-34.
- Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. "The Army as a Strategic Force in 90's and Beyond." Army Magazine, February 1990, pp. 19-26.
- Shaver, David E., LTC, ed. On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control In National Security Strategy. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989. Pp. 59-67: "After Containment: International Changes Through a Non-Authoritarian Looking Glass," by Dr. Regina Gaillard.
- Summers, Harry G., COL (Ret). "A Bankrupt Military Strategy." The Atlantic Magazine, June 1989, pp. 34-40.
- Taylor, Charles W. Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1988.
- Taylor, Charles W. A World 2010: A Decline of Superpower Influence. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1986.
- Turner, Stansfield, and Thibault, George. "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need For a New Military Strategy." Course 2, War, National Policy and Strategy, Vol. IV. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1 Sep 1989, pp. 314-327.

Watkins, James D., Adm. "The Maritime Strategy." Course 3, Implementing National Military Strategy Selected Readings, Vol. I, Academic Year 1990, 21 Sep 1989, pp. 121-131.

The White House, National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.